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I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed algorithms are often quite subtle, both in
the way they operate and in the assumptions under which
they work correctly. Indeed, several algorithms have been
found to be erroneous, and numerous misunderstandings
have arisen due to different interpretations of the precise
objectives of the algorithms and of the underlying hypothe-
ses. Formal verification is therefore crucial in distributed
computing.
In a distributed system, individual processing nodes com-
municate among each other by exchanging messages along
point-to-point channels or links. Standard interleaving mod-
els represent executions of distributed algorithms as linear
sequences of events local to the nodes: local computation,
message sending and reception. It is well known that this
fine-grained semantics leads to state explosion in model
checking approaches to verification, making it impractical to
verify more than small finite instances. It also complicates
deductive verification, because all possible intermediate sys-
tem states must be accounted for in the invariant that is at
the base of correctness proofs, yielding large and hard to
understand invariants.
We are therefore interested in models that allow us to ver-
ify algorithms over a coarser-grained representation, taking
advantage of the causal order [1] between events of a dis-
tributed system instead of explicitly considering all possible
linearizations. An important insight comes from the work of
Elrad and Francez [2] who proposed to structure distributed
algorithms into rounds that constitute communication-closed
layers: messages are delivered only in the round in which
they were sent. Indeed, many distributed algorithms are
based on this principle, which helps algorithm designers to
understand the possible global configurations a system can
be in.
Consensus is regarded as the fundamental problem that
must be solved to implement a fault-tolerant distributed
system. It requires nodes to eventually agree on a com-
mon value among the initial values held by each of them.
Agreement should be reached despite the failures of some
components (process or link). Depending on the timing
and failure models, numerous Consensus algorithms have
been proposed in the literature. We are studying techniques
for proving the correctness of these algorithms using the
interactive proof assistant Isabelle [3], aiming for a high
level of automation.
II. BENIGN ERRORS: THE HO MODEL
Charron-Bost and Schiper [4] proposed the Heard-Of
(HO) model of distributed algorithms that tolerate failures.
In marked contrast to standard models, the HO model does
not record the failures that occur during an execution, but
focuses on what “goes well”. The authors show that in this
way the model can uniformly represent all benign errors,
which include process crashes and message losses.
More precisely, an algorithm in the HO model is rep-
resented as an infinite sequence of communication-closed
rounds. In each round, every node sends messages to all
other nodes, receives messages from other nodes sent in the
current round, and processes them in a local computation
step. The set of nodes from which node n receives messages
in round r is called the heard-of set HO(n, r). Assumptions
about the failures tolerated by the algorithm are captured
by a communication predicate, which is expressed in terms
of the sets HO(n, r) that occur during an execution, and
correctness is formally asserted relative to specific commu-
nication predicates.
The HO model thus combines the communication-closed
round structure, which underlies most (if not all) known
Consensus algorithms, with a uniform and elegant way
of representing failure models in terms of correctness hy-
potheses and properties. Important properties of algorithms,
including Consensus, can be verified in terms of a coarse
execution model that models entire rounds as being per-
formed atomically [5]. This allows us to construct finite-state
representations of executions for finite algorithm instances,
despite the presence of unbounded round numbers, and to
validate algorithms using model checking.
We have represented [6] the HO model as a locale in
the interactive proof assistant Isabelle/HOL, and have since
instantiated this model for several Consensus algorithms that
appear in [4]. Making use of the coarse-grained representa-
tion of HO algorithms, and of generic lemmas proved once
and for all in the Isabelle locale, the verification of a new
algorithm now takes about one person-week, and our proofs
are shorter by roughly an order of magnitude compared to
proofs of similar algorithms in an interleaving model [7].
Most importantly, we find the proofs much more readable,
and indeed comparable to a careful pencil-and-paper proof.
III. TOWARDS MALICIOUS ERRORS: THE SHO MODEL
The HO model does not account for so-called value faults
(sometimes called malicious or Byzantine faults) that result
from values being corrupted during local computation or
message transmission. In this case, a node n receiving a
message m from some node n′ has no guarantee that m
corresponds to what n′ should have sent according to the
algorithm, be it that n′ is deliberately cheating, that a fault
occurred during its computation, or that the message was
corrupted during transmission.
Biely et al. [8] proposed an extension of the HO model
that takes into account these more general kinds of faults.
The basic idea is again to not identify a “culprit” responsible
for the fault, and to limit failures to transmission faults.
Indeed, nodes are supposed to perform state transitions
correctly, i.e., following their program code. In order to
express the discrepancies between the values that should
have been sent and those that have been received, the model
introduces sets SHO(n, r) of all nodes n′ from which n
receives the expected message for round r. Assumptions on
the occurrence of benign and value faults are formally stated
in terms of the sets HO(n, r) and SHO(n, r). Because a
node n cannot determine if a value fault has occurred, it
cannot refer to the sets SHO(n, r) in its code.
We are currently validating this model by encoding in
it some standard Consensus algorithms that tolerate value
faults. We will then extend the existing Isabelle locale to
take into account the SHO model. In future work, we are
mainly interested in two aspects: (1) a more detailed study of
the properties that are preserved by the reduction to coarse-
grained representations of runs, and (2) a higher degree of
automation in verifying such algorithms, for example by
representing elementary data structures such as HO sets
in theories that are amenable to automatic reasoning using
SMT solvers or saturation-based theorem provers.
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